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Abstract
The rapid rise of Bitcoin and other “cryptoassets” offers many
interesting technological capabilities but also comes with uncertainty
and volatility in the markets for these assets. The diversity of types
of cryptoassets is increasing rapidly, while public understanding and
government policy have generally been slow to take account of this
diversity. In regard to taxation policy related to cryptoassets, current
IRS guidance merely categorizes cryptoassets as general property. The
policy implications of this classification run contrary to fundamental
goals of tax policy by inhibiting how people use cryptoassets, making
compliance more complex and ambiguous than necessary, and taxing
cryptoasset transactions differently than analogous currency
transactions and like kind exchanges in addition to contradicting
broader domestic and foreign policy goals. A more optimal tax policy
would include (1) a general currency classification for cryptoassets;
(2) a de minimis exemption for use of cryptoassets as a medium of
exchange; and (3) an additional non-recognition exemption for gains
realized on all transactions involving only cryptoassets, such as like
kind exchanges. This proposed model would greatly improve the
efficiency, equity, and administrability of taxation related to
cryptoassets in addition to better serving public policy in other areas.
I. Introduction
Since its inception in 2009, Bitcoin has become a household name
surrounded by awe, skepticism, ambition, and often bewilderment. In less
than a decade, Bitcoin’s valuation has reached over $300 billion, sparking
an ongoing debate about its utility, price volatility, and future value. 1 In
* Arild B. Doerge, Texas A&M University School of Law, J.D., 2019. This article was
written under a graduate research fellowship for the Hagler Institute for Advanced Study
at Texas A&M University. Special thanks to Hagler Institute fellow Professor Richard A.
Epstein of the University of Chicago & New York University, Professor Max Raskin of
New York University, and Professor Vanessa Casado Perez of Texas A&M School of
Law for all their help developing these ideas.
1 See Roger Aitken, Bitcoin Surges Past $8,000 As ‘Crypto’ Market Cap Passes $300B, But Where
Next?, FORBES (July 26, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/
2018/07/26/bitcoin-surges-past-8000-as-crypto-market-cap-passes-
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parallel, there has been similar growth in a wider market for
cryptographically secured assets technically similar to Bitcoin
(“cryptoassets” generally). 2 Innovation in this market has been increasing
rapidly, even if public understanding of the technology and market is
lagging significantly. 3 Developers and proponents of cryptoassets
maintain that these new technologies have the potential to revolutionize
society and help address major global issues, while other experts are
skeptical. Though the ultimate impact is unclear, cryptoassets are already
proving to have a significant impact, even if often in niche ways.
Regardless of the ultimate impact of the technology, the burgeoning
cryptoasset market has already caused huge amounts of capital gains (and
losses) for people producing and exchanging these assets, which raises
many questions of taxation policy related to this new market.
In the United States, there has been no successful legislative action at
a federal level to address taxation of cryptoassets specifically, though some
proposals have been made in Congress that were not enacted. 4 The
existing Internal Revenue Code has been applied to identify cryptoassets
as simple property for determining taxable income. 5 This brings its own
costs and benefits as it gives a mostly transparent way for cryptoasset
buyers and sellers to report their income but also creates odd incentives
and complications due to the unique nature of cryptoassets compared to
simple commodities. With a new and innovative asset class, tax policy must
grapple with how to best promote the public policy goals of encouraging
innovation, simplifying compliance and encouraging honesty, and
furthering U.S. economic and national security interests domestically and
internationally.
This article argues that a more optimal tax policy to accomplish these
goals should (1) abandon the current simple property classification, (2)
300b/#7aaa25ef5372 (stating that the market cap valuation is calculated based on the
average exchange price for the asset and the number of tokens in circulation).
2 Different sources cited in this article use the terms “cryptocurrency,” “cryptoasset,” and
“virtual currency” more or less interchangeably. This article primarily uses “cryptoasset,”
the broadest of the terms, unless intentionally adopting the terminology of a specific
source being cited.
3 See Alex Tapscott, Cryptocurrency Is Just One of Seven Types of Cryptoassets You Should Know,
QUARTZ (July 25, 2018), https://qz.com/1335481/cryptocurrency-is-just-one-of-seventypes-of-cryptoassets-you-should-know/ (discussing the major types of cryptoassets and
distinguishing between “cryptocurrencies” and “cryptoassets” in general).
4 These legislative efforts are discussed in detail below. See discussion infra Section III-c.
5 See Virtual Currency Guidance, I.R.S. Notice 2014-21 (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
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adopt a non-recognition policy for gains realized on in-kind transactions
of cryptoassets, and (3) adopt a de minimis exemption for gains from the
use of cryptoassets as a medium of exchange in the manner of currency.
This article focuses on the policy for federal income taxation of
individuals as related to cryptoassets, but the same principles are similarly
applicable to state-level taxation. Given the potential importance of the
technology and the recent explosion in cryptoasset valuation, a new
income tax policy is necessary to both keep the Internal Revenue Code
workable for tax payers and to serve the greater foreign and domestic
policy of the United States.
II. State of the Cryptoverse
Bitcoin remains the largest player in an increasingly crowded market
of cryptoassets. The core innovation of Bitcoin is the ability to perform
person-to-person transactions over a decentralized and public ledger of
“blocks” of transactions (commonly called the “blockchain” paradigm)
made possible through calculated incentives and strong cryptography built
into the Bitcoin software. 6 The public nature of the blockchain allows
decentralized verification of transactions without the need for a thirdparty intermediary. As the original Bitcoin whitepaper states, Bitcoin was
designed to function as a “peer-to-peer version of electronic cash.” 7 This
trustless electronic cash feature allows Bitcoin to provide electronic
transactions without the need for the third-party intermediaries required
for traditional electronic transactions such as wire transfers, credit card
transactions, and electronic checks. 8 But since Bitcoin’s advent and
notoriety there has been a near-exponential growth of other
cryptoassets—generally referred to as “altcoins”—that run the gamut
from currency-type assets very similar to Bitcoin with minor technical
modifications to much more abstract and (potentially) revolutionary assets
offering a wide variety of different features. Despite scarce notoriety
among the general public compared to Bitcoin, these altcoins have taken
over a sizable share of the overall cryptoasset market, reducing Bitcoin’s

Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN.ORG,
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
7 Id.
8 Id.
6
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relative share of total valuation to less than 40% from over 94% in 2013,
comprising a wider “Cryptoverse” beyond merely Bitcoin. 9
A. Innovation, Variety, & Applications of Cryptoassets
In common media discussions, if there is discussion of the wider
market beyond merely Bitcoin, the general term “cryptocurrency” is often
used. 10 This common usage reflects both the notoriety dominance of
Bitcoin as a first-mover and the state of knowledge of the general public
and media. “Cryptoasset” is a more apt term as it better captures the
rapidly increasing breadth of innovation in the market beyond simply
currency-like assets. 11 Bitcoin and its early peers can aptly be described as
currency-type assets, providing the classic monetary functions of medium
of exchange, store of value, and unit of account. For example, Litecoin,
the next significant cryptoasset created two years after Bitcoin, was very
similar to Bitcoin in adopting the same blockchain ledger model with only
minor technical differences relating to transaction verification time, supply
of tokens, and creation method. 12 Many other currency-type competitors
to Bitcoin have come since, offering certain purported advantages over
Bitcoin in areas such as transaction speed, decentralization, and user
incentives. 13 However, there has been much more innovation in
cryptoassets that go beyond mere currency functions.
i. Platform Cryptoassets
The second major cryptoasset after Bitcoin is the Ethereum platform
that, while capable of currency functions similar to Bitcoin, offers far
more robust features such as self-executing “smart contracts” that allow
parties to the agreement to create a binding future transaction to be
executed electronically “all without middlemen or counterparty risk.” 14
Ethereum launched in 2015 and is billed as a “programable blockchain”
that allows for developers to create applications on the decentralized
See Tapscott, supra note 3.
Id.
11 Id.
12 See generally Robert McMillan, Ex-Googler Gives the World a Better Bitcoin, WIRED (Aug.
30, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/08/litecoin/.
13 See, e.g., id.
14 See generally ETHEREUM PROJECT, https://www.ethereum.org/ (last visited Feb. 2,
2019).
9

10
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Ethereum network. 15 While the Bitcoin blockchain is best described as a
“shared world ledger,” the Ethereum network promises to deliver a
“shared world computing platform that can flexibly but securely run any
application users want to code.” 16 Some early uses of the Ethereum
platform include real property deed transactions. 17 The Ethereum system
is built around use of its currency token, known as “Ether,” to regulate
the use of the network. The valuation of Ether has grown exponentially
to its current total valuation of over $75 billion, nearly half that of
Bitcoin. 18
Just as Bitcoin has many competitors as a currency-type cryptoasset,
Ethereum is also one of many competing platform cryptoassets. The Neo
“smart economy” blockchain, 19 for example, has rapidly increased in total
valuation from under $6 million in early 2017 to a peak of over $10 billion
in early 2018. 20 Neo offers many of the same distributed computing and
smart contract capabilities as the Ethereum platform, but also provides
several advantages such as superior transaction processing speed and being
cryptographically secure even after the eventual development of quantum
computing that threatens to make the encryption algorithms used by other
cryptoassets obsolete. 21 But while Neo and Ethereum are two of the larger
platform cryptoassets, there are many other competitors. 22
One of the more innovative and controversial features of platform
cryptoassets is the ability to conduct “Initial Coin Offerings” (ICO) where
developers will launch a new cryptoasset within the, for example,
Ethereum network and conduct an initial distribution of tokens for the
See What is Ethereum?, ETHEREUM HOMESTEAD DOCUMENTATION,
https://buildmedia.readthedocs.org/media/pdf/ethereumhomestead/latest/ethereum-homestead.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
16
Vitalik Buterin, What is Ethereum?, COIN CENTER (Mar. 9, 2018),
https://coincenter.org/entry/what-is-ethereum.
17 SMART LAW, https://smartlaw.io (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
18 See Ethereum (ETH) Price, Charts, Market Cap, and Other Metrics, COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018); see also
Bitcoin (BTC) Price, Charts, Market Cap, and Other Metrics, COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/bitcoin/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
19 NEO Smart Economy, https://neo.org/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).
20 See NEO (NEO) Price, Charts, Market Cap, and Other Metrics, COINMARKETCAP,
https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/neo/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
21 Kaustav, Reasons Why NEO Could Be the Strongest Cryptocurrency of 2018, GLOBAL COIN
REPORT (Apr. 17, 2018), https://globalcoinreport.com/reasons-why-neo-could-be-thestrongest-cryptocurrency-of-2018/.
22 See Tapscott, supra note 3.
15
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new cryptoasset in exchange for Ether tokens at a set exchange rate. 23
Ethereum, Neo, and other platforms have facilitated numerous ICOs,
some which have been well-received innovations 24 while others have been
nothing more than thinly veiled attempts to defraud unwitting investors. 25
Because ICOs can often resemble Initial Public Offerings (IPO) but
outside the extensive regulatory IPO framework, many governments have
taken swift action to regulate the use of ICOs. 26 In the U.S., the Securities
and Exchange Commission, which has ruled broadly in the past that
cryptoassets are not securities, has stated that most assets distributed
through ICOs probably are. 27 Still, the ICO framework has a legitimate
and innovative function provided by platform cryptoassets to launch new
cryptoasset projects and promote innovation.
ii. Privacy Oriented Cryptocurrencies
It is often pointed out, due to common misunderstanding by the
general public, that Bitcoin is not anonymous. 28 Despite the common
perception of Bitcoin as covert and anonymous, law enforcement often is
able to easily track Bitcoin payments due to the immutable public ledger
framework. 29 However, with some care and effort is possible to use Bitcoin
anonymously through the use of transaction mixing applications, Virtual
Private Networks, or the Tor anonymity network. 30 Still, since Bitcoin,
What Is an ICO?, BITCOIN MAGAZINE, https://bitcoinmagazine.com/guides/what-ico
(last visited Oct. 10, 2019).
24 See Jonnie Emsley, 10 Most Successful ICOs of All Time, INVEST IN BLOCKCHAIN (Mar.
12, 2018), https://www.investinblockchain.com/10-most-successful-icos/.
25 Ana Alexandre, New Study Says 80 Percent of ICOs Conducted in 2017 Were Scams,
COINTELEGRAPH (July 13, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/new-study-says-80percent-of-icos-conducted-in-2017-were-scams.
26 Kenneth Rapoza, After Crackdown, Nearly Every Chinese ICO Returns Cash to Investors,
FORBES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/09/25/aftercrackdown-nearly-every-chinese-ico-returns-cash-to-investors/#51510bce19ff.
27 SEC: Some Crypto Coins Are Securities (Not Bitcoin), PYMNTS (June 14, 2018),
https://www.pymnts.com/news/regulation/2018/cryptocurrency-bitcoin-ethereumsecurities/.
28 Some Things You Need to Know, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/en/you-need-toknow (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
29 Margi Murphy, Bitcoin Is Not Anonymous and Is Easy to Track, Says Met Police Chief, THE
TELEGRAPH (Mar. 7, 2018, 10:22 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2018/
03/07/bitcoin-not-anonymous-easy-track-says-met-police-chief/.
30 6 Ways to Guarantee Anonymity When Making Bitcoin Transactions, COINSUTRA (June 9,
2019), https://coinsutra.com/anonymous-bitcoin-transactions/.
23
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other cryptoassets have been developed that aim to be truly anonymous
while transactions and balances are just as secure, but mathematically
impossible to trace or analyze. 31 For example, Monero and ZCash are two
such privacy-based cryptocurrencies and have gained in popularity and
valuation. 32 These privacy oriented assets generally provide currency-like
features similar to Bitcoin, but with the added benefit of being truly
anonymous.
iii. Commodity & Property Tokens
Blockchain technology can also be used to create tokens to record and
transfer ownership of non-virtual assets. For example, the U.K. company
The Royal Mint Limited (RM) uses blockchain tokens to allow digital
trading of gold held in reserve by the company by using the token as a
certificate of ownership of the physical gold. 33 Customers purchase the
Royal Mint Gold (RMG), and each RMG token is backed by one gram of
gold bullion physically held by RM. 34 This allows customers to transfer
ownership of physical gold throughout the world without using any thirdparty facilitators, exchange accounts, or the like that would be required to
perform more typical commodity trading. This same principle can also be
applied to commodity trading generally. Similarly, there are other
blockchain projects to create land registries in which the legal ownership
of property is more clearly defined and “issues such as who is the legal
owner of a property can be remedied.” 35
iv. Utility Tokens
Many cryptoassets increasing in value are tokens created for a
particular, usually non- transactional, purpose. For example, the digital
tokens for blockchain-based decentralized cloud storage blockchains have
become more valuable recently. These tokens from several similar projects,
See Justin Connell, The Race Towards Truly Anonymous Cryptocurrency Is On, BITCOIN.COM
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/the-race-towards-truly-anonymouscryptocurrency/.
32 Id.
33 PHYSICAL GOLD DIGITALLY TRADED, THE ROYAL MINT, https://www.royalmint
.com/invest/bullion/digital-gold/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
34 Id.
35 Frederick Reese, Land Registry: A Big Blockchain Use Case Explored, COINDESK (Apr. 19,
2017), https://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-land-registry-solution-seeking-problem/.
31
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such as Sia, 36 Filecoin, 37 and Storj, 38 “leverage[] blockchain technology to
create a data storage marketplace that is more robust and more affordable
than traditional cloud storage providers.” 39 Essentially, these platforms use
their respective token to regulate and structure incentives for maintenance
and usage of decentralized cloud storage. This scheme allows users to
store data in traditional centralized cloud storage services, 40 but without
the privacy concerns of a centralized provider having access to the data 41
and at a lower cost. 42
Another example of a utility-based project is Ripple, 43 which uses its
XRP token to “to facilitate fiat money transfer in an economical and highly
efficient manner, ripple is used by multiple banks and institutions.” 44
Ripple also claims to have working partnerships with major banking and
financial firms including “UBS, Santander, BMO and American
Express.” 45 Unlike many other cryptoasset projects, Ripple is not
decentralized and focuses on integration with the established banking and
financial industry rather than creating a decentralized, trustless utility. 46
This has not prevented investors from accumulating XRP in hopes of
SIA, https://sia.tech/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
FILECOIN, https://filecoin.io/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
38 STORJ, https://storj.io/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
39 SIA, https://sia.tech/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
40 See, e.g., GOOGLE ONE, https://one.google.com/about (last visited Sept. 27, 2018)
(providing cloud storage service for $1.99 per month for 100 GB of data storage, or $0.02
per GB of data per month).
41 See, e.g., Joseph Turow, Google Still Doesn’t Care About Your Privacy, FORTUNE (June 28,
2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/06/28/gmail-google-account-ads-privacy-concerns-homesettings-policy/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
42 See, e.g., SIASTATS, https://siastats.info/storage_pricing (last visited Oct. 10, 2019)
(listing storage price of $0.39 per terabyte per month—or $0.039 per 100 GB of storage
per month—on the Sia platform).
43 RIPPLE, https://ripple.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
44 David Goodboy, 3 Types of Cryptocurrencies You Need to Know, NASDAQ (Jan. 15, 2018),
https://www.nasdaq.com/article/3-types-of-cryptocurrencies-you-need-to-knowcm905488 (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
45 Id.
46 Mike Orcutt, No, Ripple Isn’t the Next Bitcoin, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609958/no-ripple-isnt-the-next-bitcoin/
(explaining that the Ripple project’s goal is “become a “bridge currency” that many
financial institutions use to settle cross-border payments faster and more cheaply than
they do now using global payment networks, which can be slow and involve multiple
middlemen” and “was never meant to be another Bitcoin”).
36
37
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increased valuation, and this speculation has led to spectacular price
increases and volatility. 47
The preceding examples are merely illustrative and certainly
insufficient to give the full picture of the vast and diverse innovation
ongoing in the cryptoasset market. It should also be noted that these
categories are not mutually exclusive and some cryptoassets may have
attributes of multiple categories; for example, a platform token can be
used as a currency type asset, utility token, or commodity or property
token depending on how it is used. There are now thousands of emerging
projects in the market that range from unscrupulous copies of the Bitcoin
program to completely reinvented concepts for decentralization using
blockchain and other paradigms. 48 But what must be emphasized is just
how recent and rapid this innovation has been. Even the first alternative
to Bitcoin (essentially just a copy of the open source Bitcoin program) was
not created until 2011, and more innovative projects, like Ethereum
launched in 2015, were created much more recently. 49 This explosion of
innovation may be merely the ‘big bang’ and infancy of the Cryptoverse.
B. Bitcoin’s Role as Reserve Currency of the Cryptoverse
Amid the explosion of innovation (and speculation) in the
Cryptoverse, Bitcoin has come to be a de facto reserve currency for
exchanging between different cryptoassets. Due to a lack of regulation and
rapid innovation, cryptoassets are obtained most commonly through an
enormous collection of exchange websites scattered around the globe.
There are hundreds of these largely unregulated—though increasingly
regulated—exchanges which facilitate the swapping of cryptoassets for
national currencies and other cryptoassets; the daily exchange volume on
top exchanges routinely range in the billions or hundreds of millions of

Id. (discussing XRP’s price increase of over 700% in January 2018).
See Garrick Hileman & Michel Rauchs, Global Cryptocurrency Benchmarking Study,
CAMBRIDGE CTR. FOR ALT. FIN. 13, 16 (2017), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/
user_upload/research/centres/alternative-finance/downloads/2018-12-ccaf-2ndglobal-cryptoasset-benchmarking.pdf.
49 See id. at 15.
47
48
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U.S. dollars while dozens of smaller exchanges have daily volumes in the
millions. 50
These exchanges are based around trading pairs, very similar to
traditional currency exchange trading pairs, 51 which facilitate the trading
between governmental fiat currencies and various cryptoassets. 52 For
example, two of the largest exchanges, Coinbase 53 and Bitstamp, 54 each
offer trading pairs between U.S. dollars (USD) and Bitcoin, Litecoin, and
Ether among other cryptoassets. This allows in a single transaction for the
buyer to receive cryptoassets by paying USD to the seller in direct
exchange, with a small percentage fee paid to the exchange. As exchanges
are dispersed globally, the trading pairs with fiat currencies differ
depending on where the exchanges are located; but USD and Euros are
unsurprisingly the most common fiat currencies used in such trading
pairs. 55
When it comes to trading one cryptoasset for another, the situation
becomes more complicated. Exchanges frequently offer trading pairs for
cryptoassets only through Bitcoin, though this has been changing
recently. 56 This means that, for example, someone who has Litecoin tokens
wanting to obtain Ether tokens will, on many exchanges, must first trade
the Litecoin for Bitcoin and then trade the Bitcoin for Ether. Complicating
See Is Coinbase Regulated?, COINBASE, https://support.coinbase.com/customer/en/
portal/articles/2689172-is-coinbase-regulated (last visited Feb. 20, 2019) (explaining that
Coinbase is licensed to engage in money transmission in most U.S. jurisdictions); 24 Hour
Volume Rankings, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/exchanges/volume/
24-hour/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018) (providing data on trading volumes on exchange
sites).
51 See Currency Pair, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/currency
pair.asp (last visited Oct. 10, 2019).
52 See generally Prableen Bajpai, A Look at The Most Popular Bitcoin Exchanges, INVESTOPEDIA
(June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/111914/look-mostpopular-bitcoin-exchanges.asp.
53 COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
54 BITSTAMP, https://www.bitstamp.net/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
55 See Most Active Cryptocurrency Pairs, INVESTING.COM, https://www.investing.com/
crypto/top-pairs (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
56 See Daily Hodl Staff, Bitcoin Reliance Breakaway: Bittrex Launching Cardano (ADA) and
Zcash (ZEC) Fiat Pairs, THE DAILY HODL (Aug. 29, 2018), https://dailyhodl.com/
2018/08/29/bitcoin-reliance-breakaway-bittrex-launching-cardano-ada-and-zcash-zecfiat-pairs/ (“Currently, [exchange] customers need to deposit fiat into their accounts, buy
a gateway coin, such as Bitcoin (BTC), and then purchase the vast majority of altcoins
that are listed on the exchange. This is the case for numerous exchanges that list altcoins
in addition to Bitcoin, where BTC-ADA and BTC-ZEC are common trading pairs.”).
50
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matters further are the ever-shifting exchange rates of cryptoassets and
notorious volatility of cryptoasset prices. 57 This means that the
hypothetical trade of Litecoin for Ether requires a minimum of two
transactions (and two often substantial exchange fees 58) and may require
several smaller transactions at varying exchange rates, possibly spread over
hours or days. This also means that demand for Bitcoin is increased merely
by its reserve currency role driving a significant portion of the demand for
Bitcoin, which both increases the price of Bitcoin and tends to tie demand
in the wider Cryptoverse with Bitcoin specifically. This also tends to
reinforce the public perception that Bitcoin is the only cryptoasset of
significance, to the exclusion of the vast amount of innovation in the rest
of the market. For example, Bittrex, 59 another large exchange site with
trading pairs for “nearly 200 different digital coins” has operated for years
without offering any trading pairs with USD and relying heavily on Bitcoin
as the reserve currency for the exchange. 60 As discussed below, this creates
a very complex challenge for cryptoasset investors and users to comply
with prevailing U.S. tax law and Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guidance.
C. Early Impact of Cryptoassets
Despite criticism that Bitcoin and cryptoassets have limited utility, 61
there have been several notable early uses of cryptoassets. The cases of
use range from providing a relatively stable currency, to people living under
repressive and unstable governments, to facilitating illicit activities such as
57 Arthur Iinuma, Why Is the Cryptocurrency Market So Volatile: Expert Take,
COINTELEGRAPH (Feb. 27, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/why-is-thecryptocurrency-market-so-volatile-expert-take.
58 See, e.g., Coinbase Pricing & Fees Disclosures, COINBASE, https://support.coinbase.com/
customer/en/portal/articles/2109597-coinbase-pricing-fees-disclosures?b_id=13521
(last visited Nov. 3, 2019) (detailing the Coinbase fee structure that can reach close to
15% for small purchases or be as low as 1.49% for larger transactions).
59 BITTREX, https://bittrex.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2019).
60 Lily Katz, Bittrex Gets Bank Agreement to Help You Buy Bitcoin with Dollars, BLOOMBERG
(May 31, 2018, 8:04 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-31/
bittrex-gets-bank-agreement-to-help-you-buy-bitcoin-withdollars?srnd=
cryptocurriences (explaining that Bittrex has recently “forged banking agreements that
will allow some customers to trade in U.S. dollars after years of operation without direct
USD trading pairs.”).
61 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Transaction Costs and Tethers: Why I’m a Crypto Skeptic, N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/opinion/transaction-costs-andtethers-why-im-a-crypto-skeptic.html.

50
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organized crime and covert state espionage, to some adoption in the
commercial financial industry. These uses for cryptoassets, while still in
the infancy of the Cryptoverse, have been far from trivial.
i. Economic Turmoil in Venezuela
The ongoing instability and increasingly likely collapse of the
Venezuelan state 62 exemplifies one of the most often-touted advantages
of a decentralized, private, and virtual currency option like Bitcoin. Amid
rampant inflation and state-imposed price controls, Venezuelans have
turned to Bitcoin as a means of survival. 63 In many cases, Bitcoin is the
only way for people of Venezuela to pay for basic needs like medication,
food, and basic household goods; “[w]hile the price of bitcoin has been
highly volatile, Venezuelans with few or no other means of converting
their bolivars into another currency believe it is a safer bet than the
Venezuelan bills that steadily depreciate from one day to the next.” 64
Indeed, the Venezuelan Bolivar lost over 99.9% of its value over 2016–17,
making the price volatility of Bitcoin attractive by comparison. 65 The
Venezuelan government fixes official exchange rates that are a mere
fraction of black market exchange rates, meaning that the people are faced
with the choice between using black markets to exchange Bolivars for

See generally Alan Taylor, Fleeing Venezuela’s Crushing Economic Crisis, THE ATLANTIC
(Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2018/08/fleeing-venezuelascrushing-economic-crisis/568021/; Signs of Fraying in Military Support for Venezuela
President, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/
82563347aa414f1fab9c80ac87e607e9.
63 Christine Armario & Fabiola Sanchez, Venezuelans Seeing Bitcoin Boom as Survival, Not
Speculation, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/
f7ccc4ea283746f28b261cabeaf8f0c5.
64 Id.
65 Bolívar Blues: Venezuela’s Currency Plumbs Unknown Depths, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 25,
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/01/25/venezuelascurrency-plumbs-unknown-depths.
62
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other currencies or finding an alternative means of storing value if they
wish to save. 66
ii. Escaping Sanctions in Iran
Ahead of the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran,
the Iranian government began to explore the possibility of launching its
own oil-backed cryptoasset in a move that mirrored previous efforts by
the Venezuelan government in the face the ongoing collapse of its
currency. 67 Like the Venezuelan “petro,” the Iranian state-backed
cryptoasset is not likely to have success in being accepted in exchange for
fiat currencies. 68 However, Iranian citizens seeking to preserve the value
of their assets in the face of the rapid depreciation of the Iranian rial have
been turning to Bitcoin and other cryptoassets to send funds across
borders. 6969 The chairman of Iran’s economic commission acknowledged
the following:
Despite the fact that a minority of the people of our country
are customers of virtual currencies and their new markets, more
than $2.5 billion have fled the country following their purchase
while a majority of people active in this area are in it for
speculative activities and macro profits. 70

iii. Runaway Monetary Inflation in Argentina
Though not yet to the same extent as Venezuela, Argentina has
struggled with inflation, with the Argentinian peso losing more than half
its value compared to the United States Dollar in 2018 and inflation
estimated to exceed forty percent in 2018 alone. 71 In response,

Fred Imbert, Venezuela Announces a New Exchange Rate—But This One Probably Won’t
Help, Either, CNBC (Mar. 28, 2017, 2:13 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/28/
venezuelan-just-announced-a-new-currency-rate--and-nobody-cares.html?&qsearchterm
=Venezuela%20announces%20a%20new%20exchange%20rate.
67 Billy Bambrough, Iran Sanctions: People Are Turning to Bitcoin to Get Money Out, FORBES
(May 10, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2018/05/10/iransanctions-people-are-turning-to-bitcoin-to-get-money-out/#45033333613a.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Maximilian Heath, Cryptocurrency ATMs Coming to Argentina to Exploit Peso Volatility,
REUTERS (Oct. 3, 2018, 2:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-crypto66
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entrepreneurs began installing Bitcoin-enabled ATMs to allow
Argentinians to buy and sell Bitcoin with pesos. 72 U.S. company Athena
Bitcoin plans to have 1,600 of these ATMs operating in Argentina during
2019. 73 Similarly, while current ATMs are generally only enabled to buy
and sell Bitcoin, they “will eventually include other cryptocurrencies like
litecoin, ethereum and bitcoin cash.” 74 The practical implication of these
ATMs is to allow people to buy small amounts of Bitcoin to convert their
savings from pesos to Bitcoin and at least partially avoid the previously
mentioned devaluation of their pesos.
iv. Illicit Uses
The use of cryptoassets to facilitate criminal activities cannot be
denied. 75 For example, the now infamous “WannaCry” ransomware
cyberattack in 2017 involved a computer virus that “encrypts the [victim’s]
computer, essentially locking the user out of files, folders and drives on
that computer,” while the victim is prompted to pay $300 worth of Bitcoin
to the attackers’ address. 76 Bitcoin and other cryptoassets are routinely
involved in a variety of criminal activities, such as “tax evasion, money
laundering, contraband transactions, and extortion – not to mention the
theft of cryptocurrency itself.” 77 Some critics claim that criminal activity
is responsible for most, if not all, of the current market value of Bitcoin. 78

currencies-argentina/cryptocurrency-atms-coming-to-argentina-to-exploit-pesovolatility-idUSKCN1MD2FK.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See generally Eric Engle, Is Bitcoin Rat Poison? Cryptocurrency, Crime, and Counterfeiting (CCC),
16 J. HIGH TECH. L. 340 (2016); Sarah Gruber, Note, Trust, Identity, and Disclosure: Are
Bitcoin Exchanges the Next Virtual Havens for Money Laundering and Tax Evasion?, 32
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 135, 139 (2013).
76 Sheera Frenkel, Global Ransomware Attack: What We Know and Don’t Know, N.Y. TIMES
(June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/technology/global-ransom
ware-hack-what-we-know-and-dont-know.html.
77 Jason Bloomberg, Using Bitcoin or Other Cryptocurrency to Commit Crimes? Law Enforcement
Is onto You, FORBES (Dec. 28, 2017, 12:18 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/Jason
bloomberg/2017/12/28/using-bitcoin-or-other-cryptocurrency-to-commit-crimes-lawenforcement-is-onto-you/#2c97fae23bdc.
78 Id.
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A 2018 Australian study estimates that nearly half of Bitcoin transactions,
and one quarter of Bitcoin users, are associated with illegal activity. 79
However, there are drawbacks and technical complexities that make
using cryptoassets for criminal activity difficult. For example, the public
nature of Blockchain ensures that much of the information surrounding
illicit transactions is made publicly available. 80 This opens the door for
many new analysis applications that allow law enforcement to track
criminal uses of cryptoassets in ways that are not possible for more
common illicit transactions with cash. 81 Similarly, the larger cryptoasset
exchanges that allow conversion into national currencies can often be
identified when suspected criminals try to convert their cryptoassets,
allowing authorities to compel the exchanges to release the personal
information of the suspected criminals. 8281 Also, illicit use of cryptoassets
may be partly due to a broader global trend of moving to cashless
transactions, rather than exclusively to the unique advantages of using
cryptoassets for criminal activity. 83
v. Speculation, Investment, & Public Understanding
Perhaps the most notorious impact of cryptoassets has been
speculation and the incredible capital gains (and losses) of investors. The
exponential increase in the market value of cryptoassets has created a new
class of “Bitcoin billionaires,” 84 but also many investors have lost huge
sums money due to the volatility of cryptoasset prices, prompting
79 Sean Foley, Jonathan R. Karlsen & Tālis J. Putniņš, Sex, Drugs, and Bitcoin: How Much
Illegal Activity Is Financed Through Cryptocurrencies?, SSRN ELEC. J. (Dec. 14, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3102645.
80 See Mike Orcutt, Criminals Thought Bitcoin Was the Perfect Hiding Place, But They Thought
Wrong, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
608763/criminals-thought-bitcoin-was-the-perfect-hiding-place-they-thought-wrong/.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Maddy Savage, Why Sweden Is Close to Becoming a Cashless Economy, BBC (Sep. 12,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-41095004 (explaining that only
approximately 7% of transactions involve cash in the E.U. and U.S. and that “the use of
cash will most likely be reduced to ‘a very marginal payment form’ by 2020.” (citation
omitted)).
84 See Harrison Jacobs, Meet the Richest People in Bitcoin and Cryptocurrencies, Who Are Worth
More Than $17 Billion Combined, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 15, 2018, 10:51 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-billionaires-forbes-richest-people-incryptocrrency-2018-2.
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concerns of suicide. 85 Amid this uncertainty, there continues to be strong
interest among retail investors in Bitcoin and other cryptoassets. 86 The U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) continues to evaluate
proposals for cryptoasset Exchange Traded Funds (“ETF”), 87 while
several alternative investment instruments are already available to investors
through European entities. 88 Similarly, even more skeptical analysts view
cryptoasset as a potential alternative to gold and precious metals as a longterm “hedge-like” asset, even if cryptoassets do not ultimately become
widely used as currencies. 89 Even financial industry giant Goldman Sachs
is “moving ahead with plans to set up what appears to be the first Bitcoin
trading operation at a Wall Street bank.” 90
With increased speculation, public understanding of the underlying
technology of cryptoassets is lacking. 91 This lack of understanding
certainly fuels the speculation bubble effect as people purchase
cryptoassets as investments more because of its performance as a financial
asset rather than any intended use of the technology. 92 For example, one
See Daniel Roberts, Crypto Market Crash Prompts Suicide Concerns, YAHOO! FINANCE (Aug.
15, 2018), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/crypto-market-crash-prompts-suicideconcerns-135248250.html.
86 Joseph Young, Large Retail Investors See an Opportunity in Bitcoin Despite Price Decline, CCN
(April 11, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/large-retail-investors-see-an-opportunity-inbitcoin-despite-price-decline/; see generally Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren,
Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund: Operational Issues and Best Practices for an Emergent Investment
Industry, 23 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 112 (2018).
87 See Muyao Shen, The SEC Will Decide on 9 Bitcoin ETFs in the Next 2 Months, COINDESK
(Aug. 8, 2018, 9:10 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/the-sec-will-decide-on-9-bitcoinetfs-in-the-next-2-months/.
88 See generally Joseph Young, Forget the Bitcoin ETF, an ETN Already Allows US Investors to
Invest in BTC, CRYPTOSLATE (Aug. 18, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://cryptoslate.com/forgetthe-bitcoin-etf-an-etn-already-allows-us-investors-to-invest-in-btc/
(discussing
a
Swedish bitcoin ETN and its move into United States market); GRAYSCALE,
https://grayscale.co/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
89 See Crystal Kim, Bitcoin: The New Gold?, BARRON’S (Jan. 11, 2018, 9:13 AM),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/bitcoin-is-the-new-gold-says-goldman-1515624448.
90 Nathaniel Popper, Goldman Sachs to Open a Bitcoin Trading Operation, N.Y. TIMES (May
2,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/02/technology/bitcoin-goldmansachs.html.
91 See Jameson Lopp, Nobody Understands Bitcoin (And That’s OK), COINDESK (Mar. 11,
2017), https://www.coindesk.com/nobody-understands-bitcoin-thats-ok.
92 See Adrian Zmudzinski, 90% of Bitcoin Usage is Speculation — 10% TransactionsSays Luno
CEO, COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 26, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/90-of-bitcoin
-usage-is-speculation-10-transactions-says-luno-ceo.
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of the most curious successes of the early Cryptoverse has been
Dogecoin, a currency-like asset created in 2013 explicitly as a joke based
on a popular internet meme at the time. 93 Despite its inauspicious origin,
Dogecoin continues to maintain a market value generally parallel to the
wider cryptoasset market, reaching a total valuation of over $2 billion in
early 2018 when most cryptoassets also reached their most recent peak
price levels. 94 This success appears to be almost entirely due to name
recognition and speculation in the cryptoasset market generally,
exemplified recently when the popular zero fee stock investment
application Robinhood included Dogecoin among the cryptoassets to be
made available for trading on the Robinhood platform. 95
While proponents maintain that cryptoassets are merely the infancy of
a technological revolution on par with the development of the Internet, 96
critics and mainstream media outlets have proclaimed with increasing
frequency that the industry is finally dead. 97 One of the most common
refrains against Bitcoin and cryptoassets generally is a comparison 98 to the
infamous Dutch tulip speculation bubble and crash of 1637. 99 Regardless
of whether cryptoassets are truly going to revolutionize the economy or
are merely a passing speculation bubble, income tax policy must grapple
with the implications of the cryptoasset phenomenon.

Frank Chaparro, A Cryptocurrency Created as a Joke About a Dog Meme Now Has a Market
Cap Above $2 billion, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/
dogecoin-cryptocurrency-has-market-cap-above-2-billion-2018-1.
94 Id.
95 Mike Brown, Why Is Dogecoin Rising? Cryptocurrency Parody Soars After Robinhood Support,
INVERSE (July 19, 2018), https://www.inverse.com/article/47201-why-is-dogecoinrising-cryptocurrency- parody-soars-after-robinhood-support.
96 See Ari Paul, It’s 1994 In Cryptocurrency, FORBES (Nov. 27, 2017, 12:51 PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/apaul/2017/11/27/its-1994-in-cryptocurrency/#fe259
31b28a3.
97 See, e.g., Gareth Jenkinson, Tulips, Bubbles, Obituaries: Peering Through the FUD About
Crypto, COINTELEGRAPH (June 24, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/tulipsbubbles-obituaries-peering-through-the-fud-about-crypto.
98 Fred Imbert, JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon Says Bitcoin is a ‘Fraud’ that Will Eventually Blow
Up, CNBC (Sept. 12, 2017, 3:47 PM) https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/12/jpmorganceo-jamie-dimon-raises-flag-on-trading-revenue-sees-20-percent-fall-for-the-thirdquarter.html.
99 See generally ANNE GOLDGAR, TULIPMANIA: MONEY, HONOR, AND KNOWLEDGE IN
THE DUTCH GOLDEN AGE (U. Chicago Press 2007) (detailing the crash of the tulip
market).
93
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D. Predominant Types of Cryptoasset Transactions
From a taxation perspective, cryptoasset transactions tend to fall into
three main categories. 100 First and most commonly associated with Bitcoin
and cryptoassets is a currency-type transaction, where the cryptoasset is
exchanged for a good or service of some kind. 101 The obvious example is
the use of Bitcoin for a point of sale purchase for goods or similar
purchase over the internet. Even the tokens used in platform and utilitybased cryptoassets function as a sort of currency to accomplish tasks on
their respective decentralized networks. 102 For example, the token for a
cloud storage blockchain application is used to purchase storage capacity
on the network; similarly, cryptoassets are also used to transfer value, akin
to a wire transfer. 103 As discussed above, residents of Venezuela and Iran
to receive aid from family members abroad when wire transfers of
traditional currency are not possible due to governmental constraints.
The second major transaction type is a like-kind exchange where one
cryptoasset is traded for another. 104 This occurs, as discussed above, very
commonly on online exchanges where users trade cryptoassets. Further,
because many exchanges only allow customers to purchase a prominent
cryptoasset (usually Bitcoin) with traditional currency directly, to convert
traditional currency to a less prominent cryptoasset a customer will have
to conduct an additional like kind exchange. 105 So routinely, exchange
customers will, for example, must purchase Bitcoin with USD from a bank
account or through a credit card, then perform a like kind exchange of the
Bitcoin for the less prominent cryptoasset desired. 106 Similarly, ICOs,
discussed above, generally involve a like kind exchange. 107 For example,
when an ICO is conducted on the Ethereum network, developers of the

See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 IRB 938-940 (providing guidance on tax treatment
of the predominant types of transactions for which virtual currencies are used).
101 See id. (providing guidance on tax treatment of transactions where virtual currency is
exchanged for goods, services, or other property).
102 See section II(a) above for analysis of these kinds of cryptoassets.
103 See section II(a) above for analysis of these kinds of cryptoassets.
104 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 IRB 938-940 (providing guidance on tax treatment
of transactions where virtual currencies are exchanged or sold).
105 See supra II(b).
106 See supra II(b).
107 See supra II(a)(i).
100
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new cryptoasset will offer the new tokens in exchange for ether in a like
kind exchange. 108
The third prominent transaction type involves the generation of new
units of cryptoassets. 109 New units are generally created through the
respective “mining” software algorithm for the asset. 110 However, new
units can also be created through software “forks,” where a group of
developers decides to alter the software for a cryptoasset and create a
distinct variation as a separate cryptoasset. Essentially, a fork means that
the blockchain for an existing cryptoasset is duplicated and some of the
features of the algorithm are changed. Thus, after the fork, there will still
be the original legacy version of the cryptoasset with the same features
and blockchain, as well as a new modified version of the cryptoasset with
a separate blockchain after the time of the fork. For example, a 2017 fork
of the Bitcoin blockchain created a new cryptoasset known as “Bitcoin
Cash” with both having the same historical blockchain ledger. 111 In effect,
every Bitcoin wallet balance and identity was duplicated to create two
distinct blockchains with identical ledgers before the fork and unique
ledgers after. In either case, a new cryptoasset is created.
Tax policy should take account of these main three ways that people
use cryptoassets to create effective tax policy. Just as a matter of
practicality, tax policy needs to be consistent with how taxpayers use
cryptoassets to be effective. But beyond practicality, tax policy should also
serve larger public policy goals. The above discussed innovation, diversity,
and potential of the cryptoasset market should also inform the taxing
authority to promote broader public policy goals.

See supra II(a)(i).
See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 IRB 938, 939 (providing guidance on tax treatment
for “mining” virtual currency)
110
Bitcoin Magazine, What is Bitcoin Mining?, BITCOIN MAGAZINE,
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/guides/what-bitcoin-mining/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2018).
111 See generally Mike Orcutt, Wait, Bitcoin Just Did What?, MIT TECH. R. (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608483/wait-bitcoin-just-did-what/ (discussing
the politics and technical details of the Bitcoin-Bitcoin Cash fork of 2017).
108
109
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III. Prevailing Income Tax Policy for Cryptoassets
A. The Property Classification & Its Implications
The most recent guidance from the IRS on the treatment of
cryptoassets for tax purposes was released in 2014. 112 The IRS
acknowledges that cryptoassets, referred to as “virtual currency,” often
“operate[] like ‘real’ currency – i.e., the coin and paper money of the
United States . . . ,” may be “held for investment,” and are “a digital
representation of value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of
account, and/or a store of value.” 113 Using Bitcoin as an example, the IRS
notes that cryptoassets “can be digitally traded between users and can be
purchased for, or exchanged into, U.S. dollars, Euros, and other real or
virtual currencies.” 114 In regards to tax treatment, the IRS provides flatly
that “[f]or federal tax purposes, virtual currency is treated as property” and
that the “[g]eneral tax principles applicable to property transactions apply
to transactions using virtual currency.” 115 Courts have also adopted a
simple property classification. 116 The motivating force behind this now
five-year-old policy seems to have been the narrow need to define a way
for speculators in the early days of Bitcoin to report their returns. 117
Despite the incredible growth and changes in the cryptoasset market since,
the policy has not been modified.
This tax treatment means that every time a person exchanges any
amount of a cryptoasset for another cryptoasset, a national currency, or
any good or service, it creates a recognized gain or loss for tax purposes.
This is the general tax treatment for sales and exchanges of property,
which requires that the seller of the property calculate the taxable gain or
loss on the transaction by subtracting the “adjusted cost basis” paid to
acquire the property from the “amount realized” in exchange for the

I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 IRB 938 (Apr. 14, 2014).
Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., Hashfast Technologies LLC v. Lowe, 2016 WL 8460756 at *5 (Bankr. N.D.
Cal. Feb. 5, 2016) (treating Bitcoin as property and not currency in the context of a
bankruptcy proceeding).
117 See Sam Hampton, Note, Undermining Bitcoin, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 331,
332–33 (2016).
112
113
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property (e.g. the dollar amount received as payment or the fair market
value of property received as payment). 118
For example, when a person purchases an amount of Bitcoin from an
online exchange for a total cost of $1,000 and then later exchanges that
same amount Bitcoin for a piece of property with a fair market value of
$1,100, this transaction creates a positive recognized amount (or a
gain) 119106 of $100 which “must be included in gross income” for tax
purposes. 120107 This calculation must be done for every transaction where
a taxpayer sells any amount of a cryptoasset or exchanges it for any good,
service, or other asset (including a different cryptoasset) to determine the
net gain or loss from all recognized amounts in sum. Therefore, because
of how cryptoassets are used, especially in currency-type transactions and
like-kind exchanges, individual taxpayers could have thousands of
individual transactions involving several different cryptoassets, creating a
substantial record-keeping burden to determine a cost basis and gain or
loss on each transaction.
In response to this complex record-keeping burden, firms like
CoinTracker offer tax software to analyze all of a taxpayer’s cryptoasset
transactions for the year to calculate cost basis and capital gains. 121 This
service purports to greatly reduce the onerous record-keeping burden of
recording and calculating gains and losses for every transaction, but
service plans also cost up to $1,000 for the 2018 tax year. 122 This leaves
taxpayers with the choice between grappling with onerous record-keeping
on their own or paying an additional fee for professional tax preparation.
B. Taxation of Mining & Software Forks
Generation of cryptoasset units through mining and blockchain forks,
discussed above, create additional complexity and ambiguity for taxpayers.
Mining is explicitly addressed in the current IRS guidance which requires
that “fair market value of the virtual currency as of the date of receipt is
Sales and Other Disposition of Assets, I.R.S. Pub. 544, 3–4 (2017).
See Capital Gains and Losses, I.R.S. Topic No. 409 (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc409 (explaining that this gain will be either a short-term
or long-term capital gain depending on the length of time between the purchase of the
cryptoasset and the sale).
120 Sales and Other Disposition of Assets, I.R.S. Pub. 544, 3 (2017).
121 COINTRACKER, https://www.cointracker.io/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
122 COINTRACKER PLANS, https://www.cointracker.io/tax/2018/plans (last visited Oct.
31, 2018).
118
119
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includible in gross income.” 123 More simply put, when a taxpayer
successfully performs the mining process and creates new units of a
cryptoasset, the fair market value of each new unit is recognized as taxable
income at the time it is generated. To determine “fair market value,” the
IRS guidance provides that “taxpayers will be required to determine the
fair market value of virtual currency in U.S. dollars as of the date of
payment or receipt” which may be done by reference to the
contemporaneous exchange rates on exchanges that trade the virtual
currency for USD. 124 This is can be especially complex because, due to the
volatility of cryptoasset prices and variation between exchanges, there may
be no clear way to determine what a reasonable fair market value is at the
time of a specific mining operation.
In the case of software forks, however, the IRS has provided no clear
guidance despite the fact that “[t]he need for IRS guidance on this topic is
increasing in urgency as cryptocurrency forks become more common.” 125
Applying current tax law to cryptoasset forks indicates that the IRS would
likely view forks similar to “[t]reasure troves” which, like “prizes, awards,
and similar forms of income trigger immediate realizations under the
law.” 126 For example, when Bitcoin was forked to create Bitcoin cash, this
created a valuable asset, which likely created a realized and recognized
taxable event for every person with a non-zero balance in a Bitcoin wallet
at the time of the fork. 127 When “realiz[ing] the income of treasure troves,
the amount realized should equal the fair market value at the time of
acquisition.” 128 In the case of the Bitcoin Cash fork, the onus is likely on
the taxpayer to have determined the fair market value of the newly created
Bitcoin Cash and reported it as income.
However, along with the general difficulty in determining a precise fair
market value, the case of income from a software fork creates additional
complexity because it is not clear under current tax law at what time the
Virtual Currency Guidance, I.R.S. Notice 2014-21 § 4 (Apr. 14, 2014),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf.
123

124

Id.
Brad Polizzano, Cryptocurrency: Compliance Challenges and IRS Enforcement, THE TAX
ADVISOR,
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2018/oct/cryptocurrencycompliance-challenges-irs-enforcement.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
126 Nick Webb, A Fork in the Blockchain: Income Tax and the Bitcoin/Bitcoin Cash Hard Fork,
19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 283, 304 (2018).
127 Id. at 304–305.
128 Id. at 304.
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cryptoasset is actually acquired. If the taxpayer is to assume that the
acquisition was the instant of the first transaction on the Bitcoin Cash
blockchain, then determining fair market value is quite ambiguous as there
were no exchanges trading Bitcoin Cash for several days after the fork.
Similarly, the price on exchanges fluctuated wildly in the first days being
listed on exchanges, so determining a fair market value presents a
challenge.
Acquisition most likely occurs “only if and when the taxpayer
demonstrates his intent to exercise dominion and control over” the forked
cryptoasset. 129 This provides a clear time for acquisition, but still leaves the
ambiguity of calculating a fair market value.
C. Attempts at Reform
The complexities and ambiguities inherent in the prevailing IRS
guidance have not gone unnoticed by legislators. In the 113th Congress,
Representative Steve Stockton (Texas) sponsored the Online Market
Protection Act of 2014 which proposed to reclassify virtual currencies as
currency for a moratorium period of five years, doing away with the
property classification. 130 This proposal was explicitly aimed to overturn
the guidance of IRS Notice 2014–21 and require that the Federal
Government not disfavor the use of virtual currencies. 131 Congress,
however, declined to enact the Act, leaving IRS Notice 2014–21 and the
property classification as the prevailing rule for cryptoasset tax
treatment. 132
During the drafting of the major 2017 tax reform package (known as
the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” 133), Representatives Jared Polis (Colorado)
and David Schweikert (Arizona) sponsored the Cryptocurrency Tax
Fairness Act of 2017 to create an exemption to the IRS code for de minimis
Deloitte, When (and If) Income is Realized from Bitcoin Chain-Splits, at 04,
https://www.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/financialservices/us-fsi-tax-bitcoin- chain.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
130 Online Market Protection Act of 2014, H.R. 5892, 113th Cong. § 5(c) (2015).
131 Id. at § 5(b).
132
GovTrack, H.R. 5892 (113th): Online Market Protection Act of 2014,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr5892 (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
133 William G. Gale, Hilary Gelfond, Aaron Krupkin, Mark Mazur, & Eric Toder, Effects
of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: A Preliminary Analysis, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (June 14, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/effects-of-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-apreliminary-analysis/.
129
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virtual currency transactions, defined as any transaction in which the
otherwise taxable gain does not exceed $600 USD. 134 Though not
ultimately enacted with the tax reform package, this proposal would have
treated gains on cryptoasset transactions very similar to gains on
exchanges involving foreign currencies. 135 Not only would this proposal
have greatly reduced the recordkeeping burden for taxpayers who use
cryptoassets as a medium of exchange similar to a foreign currency, it
would have also greatly reduced taxable events for the trading of one
cryptoasset for another on exchanges. However, the act’s failure in the
legislature again leaves the IRS Notice 2014–21 guidance in place as the
prevailing policy for tax treatment of cryptoassets.
D. Tax Treatment
Outside the U.S. & International Competition
While many nations have done little more than apply prior tax law to
the Cryptoverse, the decision to classify cryptoassets as property by the
U.S. is not consistent with the classification by other major developed
nations, putting the U.S. at risk of foregoing some of the benefits of this
economic and technological innovation. 136 Major European countries, like
the U.K. and Germany, have recently decided to regulate cryptoassets
under a currency classification “reflect[ing] a broad international trend
which allows companies to leverage Bitcoin’s potential as a rapid crossborder payment system.” 137 The prevailing IRS guidance deviates from this
broad international trend toward uniformity in classifying cryptoassets as
currency. 138
IV. Rules for Non-Recognition & Foreign Currency
A. Non-Recognition Transactions
Under the U.S. tax code, certain transactions are not recognized for tax
purposes even when there is an actual gain or loss realized by the
Cryptocurrency Tax Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 3708, 115th Cong. § 1 (2017).
I.R.C. § 988(e)(2) (2012) (providing for de minimis exemptions for gains or losses on
foreign currency transactions where the gain or loss is less than $200 USD).
136 See Ficcaglia, Gregory V., Note, Heads or Tails: How Europe Will Become the Global Hub
for Bitcoin Business if the United States Does Not Reexamine its Current Regulation of Virtual
Currency, 40 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 103 (2017).
137 Id. at 136.
138 Id. at 136-37.
134
135
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transaction. Transactions that receive non-recognition treatment fall under
two general categories: (1) like kind transactions and (2) the involuntary
conversion transactions. 139 The latter category, not generally analogous to
cryptoasset transactions, primarily involves situations where property is
stolen, destroyed, or condemned and proceeds from the conversion are
used to purchase “property similar or related in service or use.” 140 Like
kind transactions, conversely, are much more comparable cryptoasset
transactions on online exchanges where cryptoassets are exchanged for
each other. A like kind transaction is eligible for non- recognition when
“property held for productive use in the taxpayer’s trade or business or for
investment is exchanged for property of a like kind that is also held for
productive use in a trade or business or for investment.” 141 The trading of
one cryptoasset for another is analogous to established like kind
transactions under the U.S. tax code. Similarly, non-recognition treatment
for like kind cryptoasset transactions would be more consistent with both
the traditional policy justifications for valid like kind transactions and
fundamental policy concerns of all tax policy than the prevailing tax policy
related to cryptoassets.
Nonrecognition applies to like kind transactions of real property, 142
depreciable personal property, 143 and intangible personal property. 144 The
key determination of whether an exchange is of like kind is whether the
assets exchanged belong to the same “class” of assets. 145 For real property,
“there is seldom an issue of whether the replacement property qualifies as
like kind, given that almost all real property is treated as like kind.” 146
Similarly, for both tangible and intangible personal property, the class
determinations are very broad with, for example, “[i]nformation systems
(computers and peripheral equipment)” being a single class within which
any two assets could be exchanged for each other and receive non-

Fred B. Brown, Proposal to Reform the Like Kind and Involuntary Conversion Rules in Light of
Fundamental Tax Policies: A Simpler, More Rational and More Unified Approach, 67 MO. L. REV.
705 (2002).
140 Id. at 706.
141 Id.
142 See I.R.C. § 1031 (2012).
143 26 C.F.R. § 1.1031(a)-2(b) (2019).
144 26 C.F.R. § 1.1031(a)-2(c) (2019).
145 26 C.F.R. § 1.1031(a)-2(a) (2019).
146 Brown, supra note 139, at 729.
139
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recognition. 147 For intangible property, the class determinations are
similarly broad and pertain to the underlying property such that an
exchange of one patent for another is in like kind so long as the subject
matter of the two patents belong to the same general class. 148 Conversely,
if a copyright to a song is exchanged for a copyright to a novel, this would
not be considered a like kind transaction as the underlying subject matter
are not of the same class. 149 Notably however, the tax code does not allow
for non-recognition of “exchanges of inventory property and other
property held primarily for sale, nor does it apply to financial assets such
as stocks, bonds, [or] partnership interests.” 150
The main policy justification for specific non-recognition of like kind
transactions has been based on a “continuity of investment” rationale. 151
That is, when a taxpayer makes a like kind transaction for continuing
business or investment reasons, she has “not effectively realized a profit on
the disposition” of the asset and the situation is “similar in effect to the
taxpayer continuing to hold the original property.” 152 In short, the policy
intuition is that when a taxpayer exchanges two substantially similar assets
with comparable interests in the assets, then the situation is treated as one
continuing investment.
The predominant behavior of cryptoasset users engaging in like kind
exchanges is somewhat analogous to like kind transactions subject to nonrecognition under the current tax code. Like kind cryptoasset transactions
comply with the requirement that the assets be in “productive use in[]
trade or business or for investment.” 153 The clear parallel is for cases where
taxpayers are exchanging cryptoassets for their perceived value as
investments. This is directly analogous to the existing tax rules for
exchanges of real property held for investment use.
Similarly, these like kind exchanges also comply with the requirement
that the assets not be primarily “inventory property and other property
held primarily for sale.” 154 Cryptoassets are not generally treated like an
26 C.F.R. § 1.1031(a)-2 (2019); see also Brown, supra note 139, at 730 (explaining that
“a personal computer and a printer are of like kind because they are in the same asset
class”).
148 Brown, supra note 139, at 730.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 706.
151 Id. at 714.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 706.
154 Id.
147
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inventory or property for sale. The price volatility of cryptoassets makes
it absurd to treat them as inventory rather than as an investment. Similarly,
notwithstanding the diversity and innovation in the cryptoasset market,
cryptoassets must be viewed as belonging to the same broad asset class. If,
as discussed above, a personal computer and a printer are considered like
kind assets, even the two most distinct cryptoassets would almost certainly
be in the same class. Lastly, the trading of cryptoassets for one another is
strongly supported by the continuity of investment rationale because
presumably the motivation to exchange one cryptoasset for another is a
preference for the investment value or technological features between the
two assets.
Another related, but distinct, principle in the tax code is how gains and
losses from gambling are recognized. While a gambler may have thousands
of individual gambling transactions throughout the year, these gains or
losses are taxed on net transactions for the year rather than each hand of
poker, pull of the slot machine handle, and roll of the dice being
individually recognized. 155 This scheme is similar to other non-recognized
transactions in that no gains or losses are recognized except the net
monetized amount for the year. The current tax rules for cryptoassets are
analogous to requiring a gambler to report a gain or loss on every bet.
Taxpayers who often trade cryptoassets on exchanges may have thousands
of individual transactions per year that, under the current rules, must each
be reported with the cost basis, current fair market value, and
corresponding gain or loss. The absurdity of recognizing gambling losses
and gains at every transaction should be obvious, yet this is essentially how
cryptoassets are taxed under prevailing tax policy.
As noted above, there is an exception to the like kind non-recognition
rules for financial assets such as stocks and bonds. The reason for this
exception is that these types of assets are regulated as securities, which
entails a highly specialized and complex regulatory scheme for assets that
meet the definition of a “security.” 156 Thus, an exchange of securities, for
I.R.C. § 165(d) (2012) (providing that taxation of gambling gains and losses are
recorded on net with no need to record each gambling transaction as a gain or loss).
156 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012) (defining a “security” as: “any note, stock, treasury stock,
security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided
interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on
155
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example, shares of stock in one company for shares in another company,
must be recognized at the time of the transaction and comply with other
securities regulations even though otherwise bearing the characteristics of
a like kind exchange of assets held for investment. As discussed above, the
SEC has scrutinized the method of distributing cryptoassets through
ICOs, concluding that in many cases ICOs meet the definition of a
securities offering as an “investment contract.” 157 This determination is
particular to the method of distribution where there is “an investment of
money in a common enterprise with an expectation of profit derived from
the efforts of others” and is not particular to cryptoassets in themselves. 158
While this rule is applicable to certain ICOs that are highly centralized
with a single enterprise distributing tokens for sale, cryptoassets
themselves are not securities in that they do not in any sense represent
equity or debt to satisfy the definition of a security. Indeed, “investment
contracts can be made out of virtually any asset (including virtual assets),
provided the investor is reasonably expecting profits from the promoter’s
efforts.” 159 SEC officials have accordingly acknowledged that “[a]pplying
the disclosure regime of the federal securities laws to the offer and resale
of Bitcoin” or “to current transactions in Ether would seem to add little
value.” 160 This means simply that cryptoassets, like any other type of asset,
can be regulated as securities if distributed in the specific manner of an
investment contract. Other than in investment contract circumstances,
securities are not analogous to cryptoassets and rules for securities do not
provide guidance for crafting tax policy.
Thus, the general rules for non-recognition of like kind exchanges and
for taxation of gambling income are closely analogous to like kind
any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest
or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”) (emphasis added).
157 William Hinman, Dir., Div. Corp. Fin., U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, Digital Asset
Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic), (June 14, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/speech-hinman-061418 (applying the Howey test to determine whether an
investment contract has been created, articulated by the Supreme Court in S.E.C. v. W.J.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946)).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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exchanges of cryptoassets, such as with online exchanges. Similarly,
cryptoassets themselves do not share any of the equity or debt
characteristics of securities and can only implicate securities regulations
due to the manner of distribution, which is equally true with any kind of
asset. Therefore, the general rules for non- recognition of like kind
exchanges and individual gambling transactions are instructive for crafting
good tax policy for cryptoassets while the unique and highly specialized
rules for securities are not.
B. Transactions Involving Foreign Currencies
When taxpayers transact in foreign currencies, the tax code
provides for de minimis exemptions for gains or losses on foreign currency
transactions where the gain or loss is less than $200 USD. 161 Under this
policy, when taxpayers use foreign currency to transact, there are rarely
occasions for a gain or loss of more than $200 on any one transaction
aside from in very large transactions or in cases of unusual volatility in
exchange rates. The alternative to this exemption rule would require a
reporting of a gain or loss on each transaction, which would greatly
complicate compliance by requiring extensive record keeping. For
example, without this exemption, a U.S. taxpayer who travels abroad and
uses foreign currency to make purchases would have to calculate the cost
basis for the foreign currency when it was acquired (i.e. the exchange rate)
and then calculate a gain or loss for every transaction using the foreign
currency.
As discussed above, one of the most common uses for cryptoassets is
a currency-type transaction. Because current IRS guidance classifies
cryptoassets as property, it has been criticized for generally being
“contradictory to the view of several other federal stakeholders, including
courts and regulatory agencies,” as well as being “contradictory to how
users view and use cryptocurrencies, and how the market has accepted
cryptocurrencies for the purchase of goods and services.” 162 In addition,
the “loopholes and bookkeeping difficulties” created by the current IRS

I.R.C. § 988(e)(2) (2012).
Deidre A. Liedel, The Taxation of Bitcoin: How the IRS Views Cryptocurrencies, 66 DRAKE
L. REV. 107, 145 (2018).
161
162
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guidance has been criticized. 163 Underscored by both the Online Market
Protection Act of 2014 and the Cryptocurrency Tax Fairness Act of 2017,
many commentators have also strongly criticized the general property
classification of cryptoassets and recommended a currency
classification. 164 Because cryptoassets are notoriously used like currency, it
follows logically that they be treated like currency when used as such.
V. Public Policy Evaluation
Taxation policy is generally evaluated by the three fundamental criteria
of efficiency, equity, and administrability. 165 The efficiency criterion
concerns the “minimizing [of] tax-induced changes in taxpayer behavior
or decisions, or what are referred to as ‘substitution effects.’” 166 The equity
criterion requires that “similarly situated taxpayers be taxed in a similar
manner” and “differently situated taxpayers be treated in an appropriately
different manner.” 167 The administrability criterion is concerned with
minimizing complexity and reducing ambiguity in the tax system. 168 To
judge the adequacy of the tax scheme related to cryptoassets, the three
fundamental criteria must be used to analyze the implications of the

Zachary B. Johnson, Note, I Got 988 Problems But Bitcoin Ain’t One: The Current Problems
Presented by the Internal Revenue Service’s Guidance on Virtual Currency, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 633,
673 (2016).
164 See, e.g., Liedel, supra note 162, at 145 (arguing that the property classification “is
contradictory to the view of several other federal stakeholders, including courts and
regulatory agencies” and “is also contradictory to how users view and use
cryptocurrencies, and how the market has accepted cryptocurrencies for the purchase of
goods and services.”); Johnson, supra note 163, at 673 (advocating a currency
classification to “smooth the path for broader adoption and investment in Bitcoin and
virtual currencies generally” and to remedy the “loopholes and bookkeeping difficulties”
created by the property classification); Ficcaglia, supra note 136, at 136 (“Defining Bitcoin
as a currency allows individuals and companies to fully leverage the potentially market
changing transfer technology, extending the innovations of the digital era to financial
transactions”).
165 Fred B. Brown, Proposal to Reform the Like Kind and Involuntary Conversion Rules in Light of
Fundamental Tax Policies: A Simpler, More Rational and More Unified Approach, 67 MO. L. REV.
705, 708 (2002).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 710–11.
168 Id. at 712–13.
163
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scheme for how people use cryptoassets: currency-type transactions, like
kind exchanges, and generation of new units, as discussed above.
By each of the three fundamental criteria, the prevailing tax policy on
cryptoassets must be judged as seriously defective. In addition to the
failure of the prevailing IRS guidance on cryptoassets to serve the three
fundamental goals of tax policy, it also fails to promote public policy in
three key areas. First, the prevailing policy discourages innovation and
economic efficiency. Second, it is difficult to enforce the prevailing policy,
leading to massive under-reporting by tax payers and reduced tax receipts.
Third, the U.S. is at risk of falling behind global competitors for the
economic, technological, and strategic innovations cryptoassets can
provide.
A. Efficiency, Equity, & Administrability
of the Prevailing Policy
The prevailing policy fails substantially to promote efficiency. For all
transaction types, taxpayers are incentivized to forego any transactions if
there has been an appreciation in market value for their cryptoassets. In
addition to the additional transaction cost from additional tax recognition
from a transaction, the requirement to report every currency-type
transaction as a gain or loss also adds a substantial record-keeping burden
to the transaction cost. Both of these problems create purely tax-based
disincentives for the most common ways people transact with
cryptoassets.
Similarly, the equity criterion is clearly violated in regard to currencytype and in-kind cryptoasset transactions. The property classification
requires these transactions be treated differently than the analogous
transactions involving foreign currency and in-kind exchanges subject to
non-recognition. Correspondingly, the property classification requires
both types of cryptoasset transactions be treated like fundamentally nonanalogous transactions such as exchanges of property of different classes
or financial instruments. This flatly contradicts the policy goal of equity.
Perhaps most lacking in the prevailing policy is administrability, due to
the complexity and ambiguity to which cryptoasset users are subjected. As
discussed above, in addition to the burdensome reporting requirements,
cryptoasset users also bear the burden of calculating the cost basis of their
cryptoassets by means of reasonable fair market value. The problem is
especially poignant for taxpayers who have exchanged one type of
cryptoasset for another. After the exchange, they then must determine the
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reasonable fair market value both of the asset sold and the asset received
to comply with current tax guidance. Taxpayers also face the notable holes
in IRS guidance with respect to income from software forks, further
diminishing the administrability of the prevailing policy.
B. Discouraging Innovation & Economic Efficiency
Due to the property classification, recognizing a gain or loss at every
cryptoasset transaction, the current IRS guidance creates unnecessary
transaction costs. Beyond the onerous record-keeping burden, this
guidance disincentivizes the most efficient allocation of resources because
any exchange of one cryptoasset for another requires an additional
calculation of the tax liability that might be incurred by making the
exchange. While the exchange might be the more optimal use of resources,
the additional tax burden can often prevent the exchange from taking
place. Similarly, by undermining the broad global trend of classifying
cryptoassets as currency, the U.S. is failing to “stabilize the Bitcoin
ecosystem, mitigate the risks associated with Bitcoin’s inherent privacy, and
help ensure that Bitcoin users will not be subjected to unfair practices by
those in the industry seeking to defraud individual users.” 169 Given the rich
variety and innovation in the Cryptoverse, tax policy should strive to
promote—rather than stifle—the efficient allocation of resources within
the market.
C. Enforcement Concerns
The current guidance also creates incentives to simply not report gains
or losses related to cryptoasset transactions at all. This problem comes
necessarily with the administrability issues discussed above for all
transaction types. The record-keeping burden incentivizes intentional nonreporting out of frustration. Additionally, the property classification
incentivizes tax evasion out of ignorance because it is counterintuitive to
how taxpayers use and think of cryptoassets as a type of currency or a
continuous investment. As a result, the vast majority of cryptoasset users
in the U.S. likely did not report their related gains and losses on their 2017
income taxes as required by current IRS guidance. 170 This is despite the
Ficcaglia, supra note 136, at 133.
Evelyn Cheng, Hardly Anyone is Paying Taxes on Their Bitcoin Gains as Filing Deadline
Nears, CNBC. (April 13, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/13/hardly-anyone-ispaying-taxes-on-their- bitcoin-gains-as-filing-deadline-nears.html (explaining the vast
169
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fact that 2017 saw a massive increase in cryptoasset market prices which
resulted in an estimated $25 billion USD in related tax liability. 171
The current rules are similarly difficult to enforce. The IRS, for the
first time in late 2016, issued a “John Doe Summons” to Coinbase, one of
the largest cryptoasset exchanges in the world, attempting to access all user
identity and transaction information. 172 This move prompted immediate
legal challenges by Coinbase customers alleging a violation of their privacy
rights. 173 Obtaining user and transaction information as a method of
enforcement is also likely to be, at best, marginally effective due to the
wide variety of cryptoasset exchanges available globally that may be
beyond the reach of IRS power.
D. Hampering U.S. Economic & Foreign Policy Interests
The current rules also put the U.S. at a marked disadvantage in the
global economy. The U.S. is at a significant disadvantage in the competition
for “development of new financial technologies centered around Bitcoin
and the blockchain” while also undermining the creation of “a more
uniform system of regulations . . . to provide a stable environment for the
currency and technology to grow.” 174 This also means U.S. taxpayers will
ultimately forego the economic benefits coming from both a more stable
cryptoasset market and the U.S. taking a leading role in the development
of emerging cryptoasset technologies. Under current policy, other
developed nations like the U.K. and Germany are more likely to see the
economic benefits of embracing cryptoassets.
Also, a more stable cryptoasset market provides an interesting foreign
policy tool from which the U.S. could greatly benefit. As discussed above,
in humanitarian and economic crises like that in Venezuela, cryptoassets
provide a potent means for an impoverished population to avoid the
irrationalities of a corrupt state apparatus and the risk of violence in black
markets. If the U.S. fosters, rather than ignores, the growth of the
cryptoasset market, a more stable and robust market could make
cryptoassets even more effective than they have been for the desperate
majority of tax payers with cryptoasset-related gains or losses are simply not complying
with IRS guidance).
171 Id.
172 Austin Elliott, Collection of Cryptocurrency Customer-Information: Tax Enforcement Mechanism
or Invasion of Privacy?, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 11–13 (2017).
173 Id. at 14–15.
174 Ficcaglia, supra note 136, at 136–37.
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citizens of Venezuela. President Trump recently stated, “all options are on
the table” for addressing the unfolding humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. 175
Cryptoassets are already providing relief to imperiled Venezuelans, and a
more stable global cryptoasset industry would offer even better relief.
VI. Proposed Taxation Model
A more optimal model would include a (1) general currency
classification, (2) an increased de minimis exemption for gains not exceeding
$600 on cryptoasset transactions as proposed by the Cryptocurrency Tax
Fairness Act, 176 and (3) a non-recognition exception to the currency
classification for gains realized on all non-monetization 177 cryptoasset
transactions. The policy of the first proposal in this model has been
advocated many times and incorporates elements of both the Online
Markets Protection Act of 2014 and the Cryptocurrency Tax Fairness Act
of 2017 to acknowledge how cryptoassets are used in currency-type
transactions. 178 This would do much to reduce the record-keeping burden
on taxpayers and is much more reasonable than the current rule in light

Elizabeth McLaughlin, Is Trump Really Leaving Military Option Open for Venezuela?, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 26, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-leaving-militaryoption-open- venezuela/story?id=58102026.
176 Current tax law on foreign currency transactions already provides for a de minimis
exemption for gains not exceeding $200. I.R.C. § 988(e)(2)(B) (2012). But the
Cryptocurrency Tax Fairness Act increases this exemption to gains or losses less than
$600 on cryptoasset transactions. Cryptocurrency Tax Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 3708,
115th Cong. § 1 (2017). Given the high volatility of cryptoasset prices, the higher
exemption amount seems more prudent which is why this article does not simply propose
a currency classification alone.
177 This includes (1) in-kind transactions of trading of one cryptoasset for another, (2)
mining proceeds, and (3) income from Blockchain forks. Essentially, no gain or loss on
a cryptoasset transaction would be recognized unless it involves the exchange of a
cryptoasset for a fiat currency, goods (other than another cryptoasset), or services. Stated
differently, the nonrecognition exemption applies only to transactions that involve only
cryptoassets and no fiat currency or property being exchanged. Accordingly, if
cryptoassets were traded for fiat currencies in currency exchange markets, these
transactions would be regulated by the SEC under the well-established rules for “Forex”
markets. See Forex - Foreign Currency Transactions, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.
gov/answers/forcurr.htm (last modified Oct. 1, 2013).
178 See, e.g., Ficcaglia, supra note 136, at 119.
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of how cryptoasset exchanges work, and Bitcoin’s role as a quasi-reserve
currency for many exchanges.
The second proposal acknowledges the prominence of like kind
exchanges and is slightly more aggressive as it is a new policy not
achievable by a simple classification change or exception to existing law.
However, this proposal is crucial to supporting optimal tax policy because
it further reduces record-keeping burdens, promotes economic efficiency
and stability within the Cryptoverse, and incentivizes investment in the
U.S. while supporting global regulatory uniformity. This proposal also
simplifies taxation of income from cryptoasset mining and software forks
by not recognizing the transaction until the assets are exchanged for fiat
currency or property. This provides much more definite methods of
determining both the time of the transaction and the market value of the
transaction. This proposal greatly simplifies tax policy and promotes
compliance.
A. Efficiency, Equity, & Administrability
of the Proposed Model
First, the proposed model greatly improves efficiency both by
removing the record- keeping burden (for like kind and currency-type
transactions) and largely eliminating the disincentive to participate in a
cryptoasset transactions. This disincentive stems from the appreciation in
value of a cryptoasset requiring that any future transaction will increase
taxable income. Second, because cryptoasset transactions are analogous to
either foreign currency transactions or like kind exchanges, equity
demands that they be treated similarly in these circumstances. And,
conversely, an equitable policy would not treat cryptoasset transactions the
same as generic property transactions where the two are not analogous.
The proposed model accomplishes both equity goals by treating
cryptoassets as currency when used like currency, and as like kind assets
when exchanged for assets in the same class. Third, the proposed model
greatly reduces the complexity of the tax system by eliminating the
reporting requirements for transactions with a monetized gain of under
$600. This accounts both for usage of cryptoassets as currency, and the
higher volatility of cryptoasset prices warranting a higher de minimis
exemption amount than for foreign currency transactions.
In addition to far surpassing the current tax policy as evaluated by the
efficiency, equity, and administrability criteria, the proposed model is likely
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to be tax revenue neutral at worst and is more likely to increase tax receipts
compared to the current tax environment.
Because of under-reporting of cryptoasset-related income is rampant
under the current system, the proposed model would significantly increase
net tax receipts even if the nominal tax burden is reduced. Not only would
the proposed model be significantly more efficient, equitable, and
administrable, it would also likely increase tax receipts.
B. Encouraging Innovation & Economic Efficiency
The proposed taxation model promotes a more efficient allocation of
resources within the Cryptoverse by removing tax-related transaction costs
and administrative burdens. There would be no concerns about short-term
and long-term capital gain categorizations to prevent reallocating
resources from one cryptoasset investment to another. A currency
classification and de minimis exemption accords with how cryptoasset
exchanges operate with major cryptoassets like Bitcoin being required to
purchase less popular cryptoassets. The intermediate transactions
between—for example buying Bitcoin with USD and then trading the
Bitcoin for the desired cryptoasset—would no longer create any
recognized gain or loss for tax purposes, no matter the amount. This
eliminates the added record-keeping burden and removes transaction costs
to promote the best allocation of resources within the Cryptoverse.
The non-recognition proposal removes all barriers to efficiently
allocating resources by removing any tax liability for in-kind exchanges.
This encourages investors to freely exchange cryptoassets, and to seek the
best investment without being deterred by tax recognition. The current tax
code already recognizes the importance of this principle by adopting a
non-recognition policy for certain in-kind real estate transactions when the
property is held for productive use or investment. 179 This policy promotes
the best use of property by removing the potentially massive transaction
cost of a taxable gain on a real estate transaction. The same principle
applies to cryptoassets where taxpayers are currently incentivized to hold
any cryptoassets that have increased in market value rather than trading
for another cryptoasset that might be more innovative and attractive as an
investment. Further, the non-recognition proposal is at worst revenue
neutral in the long run, because taxable gains will still be recognized
I.R.C. § 1031 (2012) (providing a tax exemption for gains and losses from like kind
exchanges of real estate).
179
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whenever the previously realized gains are monetized for the first time.
More likely, this policy would add to tax revenue by reducing the currently
rampant level of nonreporting.
C. Discouraging Tax Evasion & Simplifying Compliance
The added burden of record-keeping and reporting of every
transaction under the current scheme encourages non-reporting and tax
evasion, even just by ignorance or error. The proposed model would
remove nearly all of the record-keeping burden and make compliance
much simpler. First, a de minimis exemption would remove the small
transactions from the taxpayer’s concern, and thus eliminate a common
reason for non-reporting out of ignorance. Second, a currency
classification would allow cryptoassets to be used for larger purchases
under the well-established rules for taxation of gains on foreign currency
transactions. Third, the non- recognition for in kind transactions removes
the need for any disclosure of gains or losses from transactions of one
common cryptoasset for another, greatly reducing the record-keeping
burden on taxpayers. Similarly, due to the current level of non- reporting,
the scheme would likely produce more tax revenue due to a higher rate of
reporting, even if the de minimis exemption results in a lower amount of
taxable income from cryptoasset transactions.
D. Furthering U.S. Economic & Foreign Policy Interests
As previously discussed, the U.S. is failing to capture the growth and
innovation of the cryptoasset market to the benefit of other countries. If
the U.S. fails to make sensible policy, other countries will reap more of the
benefits from the growing market. 180 Also, the stable decentralized
monetary system cryptoassets can provide can be a powerful tool against
despotism, corruption, and instability in the developing world. U.S.
intelligence agencies could benefit from a stable cryptoasset market
similarly to how they have benefitted from Internet privacy technologies.
For example, U.S. intelligence agencies have provided covert support for
the Tor anonymous Internet browser as a means to undermine the control
of authoritarian regimes over the speech and information access of the
populace. 181 Cryptoassets offer similar tactical potential in allowing
Ficcaglia, supra note 136, at 133.
YASHA LEVINE, SURVEILLANCE VALLEY: THE SECRET MILITARY HISTORY OF THE
INTERNET, at 219-70 (2018) (detailing U.S. intelligence agency backing for the Tor
180
181

76

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21

dissidents to circumvent the banking and monetary systems controlled by
authoritarian regimes to receive support from outside and conduct
economic transactions privately. Cryptoassets offer exceptional
capabilities for dissidents living under authoritarianism to conduct
commercial transactions and receive aid from abroad against the will of a
repressive regime.
VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, the current IRS guidance on cryptoassets fails to
promote good public policy by making compliance more onerous than
necessary on the taxpayer, making tax evasion by ignorance likely, and
undermining the establishment of a stable global cryptoasset market. A
more optimal model would include a (1) general currency classification for
cryptoassets; (2) de minimis exemption for use of cryptoassets as a medium
of exchange, higher than the exemption amount for foreign currency
transactions; and (3) non-recognition exemption from the general
currency rules for gains realized on all non-monetization cryptoasset
transactions. Where the current tax policy in the U.S. tends to undermine
the major potential benefits of cryptoassets, this proposed policy would
reinforce them and take a significant step toward a stable market for
cryptoassets while also serving other important public policy goals.

anonymity browser as a means of advancing U.S. national security interests as a weapon
in the global “Internet Freedom conflict” by undermining the ability of foreign regimes
to control communications of their citizens); Yasha Levine, Fact-checking the Tor Project’s
Government Ties, SURVEILLANCE VALLEY BLOG (27, 2018), https://surveillancevalley
.com/blog/fact-checking-the-tor-projects-government-ties.

